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“Your identity is your most valuable possession.”1 Imagine if this vital aspect of
who you are was taken from you and there was nothing you could do to protect it.
Identity theft is not a hypothetical fear—it is a reality that approximately 16.7 million
Americans faced in 2017.2 The healthcare industry is a particularly “attractive target”
for hackers.3 The potential harm can include financial loss; credit troubles; erroneous
medical records; loss of federal or state benefits; and even criminal implications, such
as false arrest.4 With technological advancements outpacing security measures and
instances of identity theft on the rise, you might be more at risk than you think.5
In Chambliss v. CareFirst, Inc., the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland considered whether customers of CareFirst health insurance, whose
information was stolen as a result of a data breach, had Article III standing to bring
their putative class action.6 If successful, CareFirst’s customers would have been able
to litigate their various tort, negligence, and statutory claims in federal court.7
Instead, the court dismissed their claims, finding that the Chambliss plaintiffs failed
to produce evidence sufficient to confer standing.8

1.

The Incredibles (Pixar Animation Studios 2004).

2.

Al Pascual, Kyle Marchini & Sarah Miller, 2018 Identity Fraud: Fraud Enters a New Era of Complexity,
Javelin (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.javelinstrategy.com/coverage-area/2018-identity-fraud-fraudenters-new-era-complexity; see also Ben Keylor, What Are Your Odds of Getting Your Identity Stolen?,
IdentityForce: Identity & Privacy (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.identityforce.com/blog/identitytheft-odds-identity-theft-statistics (discussing the likelihood of becoming a victim of identity theft).

3.

Matthew Goldstein & Reed Abelson, Up to 1.1 Million Customers Could Be Affected in Data Breach at
Insurer CareFirst, N.Y. Times (May 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/21/business/
carefirst-discloses-data-breach-up-to-1-1-million-customers-affected.html?_r=0; see also Paige Schaffer,
Data Breaches on the Rise: How Healthcare Organizations Can Protect Against Medical Identity Theft,
Healthcare Analytics News (July 3, 2018), https://www.hcanews.com/news/data-breaches-on-therise-how-healthcare-organizations-can-protect-against-medical-identity-theft (“[H]ealth system
cybersecurity is, like in many other industries, inadequate.”).

4.

What Are the Effects of Identity Theft?, TransUnion: Identity Protection (Oct. 12, 2016), https://
www.transunion.com/blog/identity-protection/what-are-the-effects-of-identity-theft. The Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) has recognized that “[o]nce identity thieves have your personal information,
they can drain your bank account, run up charges on your credit cards, open new utility accounts, or get
medical treatment on your health insurance,” and can even “file a tax return in your name and get your
refund.” Fed. Trade Comm’n, Warning Signs of Identity Theft, IdentityTheft.gov, https://www.
identitytheft.gov/Warning-Signs-of-Identity-Theft (last visited Mar. 28, 2019).

5.

See Rajiv Leventhal, Report: In New Digital Environments, Data Breaches Are the Norm, Healthcare
Informatics ( Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.healthcare-informatics.com/news-item/cybersecurity/
report-new-digital-environments-data-breaches-are-norm (“[W]hile times have changed with respect
to technological advancements, security strategies have not . . . leaving customer data . . . severely at
risk.”); see also Keylor, supra note 2 (“Unfortunately, even though people may think [identity theft] is
somewhat rare, identity theft statistics show that your chances of being affected might be much higher
than you think.”).

6.

189 F. Supp. 3d 564, 566–67 (D. Md. 2016).

7.

Id. at 567.

8.

Id. at 571.
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On May 20, 2015, the New York Times reported that CareFirst, a Maryland
health insurance provider, announced that a recent hack compromised the confidential
personal information of over one million of its customers,9 including their names,
birth dates, e-mail addresses, and subscriber identification numbers.10 As a health
insurance provider, CareFirst was likely an attractive, “soft target” for hackers11: Like
most in the healthcare industry, CareFirst’s computers and data storage devices were
not encrypted.12
After learning of the breaches, CareFirst customers (“Plaintiffs”) brought a class
action against CareFirst.13 In response, CareFirst filed a motion to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Plaintiffs lacked standing.14 To establish
standing, a plaintiff must show that they have suffered an “injury in fact,” which is
an invasion of a legally protected interest that is both (1) concrete and particularized
and (2) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.15 Plaintiffs argued that
an increased risk of future harm—specifically, identity theft—satisfied the requisite
injury for the court to have jurisdiction to adjudicate their claims.16 Ultimately, the
court held that Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden and granted CareFirst’s motion
to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.17
9.

Goldstein & Abelson, supra note 3.

10.

Chambliss, 189 F. Supp. 3d at 567. A subscriber identification number is the number associated with a
customer’s particular health insurance plan. What Is a Subscriber ID Number for Health Insurance?,
Health Ins. Providers, https://www.healthinsuranceproviders.com/what-is-a-subscriber-for-healthinsurance (last updated Apr. 10, 2017).

11.

See Goldstein & Abelson, supra note 3; see also Erin McCann, Anthem Hack: ‘Healthcare Is a Target,’
Healthcare IT News (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/anthem-hackhealthcare-target?mkt_tok=3RkMMJWWfF9wsRols6rIZKXonjHpfsX56eoqUaW%2BlMI%2F0ER3
fOvrPUfGjI4CRMpjI%2BSLDwEYGJlv6SgFQ7LHMbpszbgPUhM%3D (explaining that healthcare
organizations are “soft targets” because “historically, [they] have invested less in [information
technology], including security technologies and services than other industries,” and are thus more
vulnerable to cyberattacks).

12.

Class Action Complaint at 4, Chambliss, 189 F. Supp. 3d 564 (No. RDB-15-2288).

13.

Plaintiffs, represented by litigants Pamela Chambliss and Scott Adamson, asserted five claims arising
under federal and Maryland law: negligence; breach of implied contract; unjust enrichment; declaratory
judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2016); and violation of the Maryland Personal Information
Protection Act, Md. Code Ann., Com. Law §§ 14-3501–3508 (West 2018). Chambliss, 189 F. Supp. 3d
at 567; Class Action Complaint, supra note 12, at 6–7.

14.

Chambliss, 189 F. Supp. 3d at 568. A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction “challenges
a court’s authority to hear the matter brought by a complaint.” Id. CareFirst also filed a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, but the Chambliss court only addressed CareFirst’s jurisdictional
objections. Id.

15.

Id. at 569 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). As the party seeking federal
jurisdiction, Plaintiffs had the burden of establishing standing, which also requires showing that the
alleged injury is fairly traceable to the defendant and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Id.
at 569. This Case Comment addresses the injury-in-fact requirement of standing.

16.

See Chambliss, 189 F. Supp. 3d at 569. Plaintiffs argued three other theories of injury that were considered
by the court, see id., but are not discussed in this Case Comment.

17.

Id. at 572–73.
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In reaching its conclusion, the court looked to the “certainly impending” test laid
out in 2013 by the United States Supreme Court in Clapper v. Amnesty International
USA,18 and stated that in cases involving risk of future harm, “the threatened injury
must be certainly impending to constitute an injury in fact. . . . In other words, there
must be a ‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.”19 The Chambliss court reasoned
that even though Plaintiffs’ information was stolen, under Clapper, the alleged injury
was not “certainly impending” because their theory of future harm “depend[ed] on a
chain of assumptions that must occur before the harm materializes,” namely, “on the
actions of an unknown independent third party.”20 Finding it unclear whether, when,
or how a hacker would use their stolen information to cause future harm, the court
held that Plaintiffs’ alleged injury was too speculative to be “certainly impending”
and dismissed their case.21
This Case Comment contends that the Chambliss court incorrectly analyzed the
injury-in-fact requirement of Article III standing, thus denying Plaintiffs the ability
to proceed on the merits of their claims. First, the court incorrectly intertwined the
“certainly impending” and “substantial risk” tests, which are actually two separate
analyses. Second, the court failed to recognize that Clapper’s overly rigorous future
risk of harm analysis is inapplicable to data breach cases. Finally, the court’s decision
sets a precedent that essentially forces customers whose information has been
compromised to wait until their stolen identity is wrongfully used before they can sue
in federal court.
First, the Chambliss court failed to distinguish the “certainly impending” test
from the “substantial risk” test when analyzing whether future harm satisfies the
injury-in-fact requirement of Article III standing. To constitute an injury in fact, the
injury must be “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”22 Thus, in cases
when harm has not yet occurred, for harm to be “imminent” it must be “certainly
impending,” or there must be a “substantial risk that the harm will occur.”23 The
“certainly impending” and “substantial risk” tests are separate and distinct: As the
Court in Clapper acknowledged when applying the former, “[o]ur cases do not
uniformly require plaintiffs to demonstrate that it is literally certain that the harms
they identify will come about. In some instances, we have found standing based on a
‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur . . . .”24 But the Supreme Court has used
18.

568 U.S. 398 (2013).

19.

Chambliss, 189 F. Supp. 3d at 569 (first quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 401; then quoting Susan B.
Anthony List v. Driehaus, 57. U.S. 149, 158 (2014)).

20. Id. at 570.
21.

Id. at 570–72.

22.

Driehaus, 57. U.S. at 158 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).

23.

See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409, 414 n.5.

24.

Id. (emphasis added); see also Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015) (stating
that the Supreme Court “did not jettison the ‘substantial risk’ standard” when it applied the “certainly
impending” test in a case involving a high degree of speculation of future harm); Arthur R. Vorbrodt,
Clapper Dethroned: Imminent Injury and Standing for Data Breach Lawsuits in Light of Ashley Madison, 73
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both standards in different contexts, 25 leading to some mixed applications among the
lower courts.26
Nonetheless, the “certainly impending” test is a stricter standard than the
“substantial risk” test.27 In light of this fact, some lower courts have recognized that
the lower, “substantial risk” standard—or something akin to it—is more appropriate
for data privacy cases. For example, in 2010 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in Krottner v. Starbucks Corp. granted standing based on “a credible threat of
harm” from a stolen laptop containing sensitive personal information.28 The court
found that the plaintiffs’ increased risk of identity theft was sufficient to constitute
injury in fact, even though no theft had yet occurred.29
More recently, the Seventh Circuit in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group held that
the alleged future threat of identity theft created a substantial risk of harm and was
therefore sufficient to constitute an injury in fact.30 Remijas involved a data breach at
the department store Neiman Marcus.31 Neiman Marcus confirmed the breach and
notified customers that their payment card account information, but no other
personal information, had been potentially exposed.32 Nonetheless, the court found
the risk of future injury “substantial” because the hacker most likely intended to
someday use the breached information to the detriment of the victims.33
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. Online 61, 73 (2016) (“The [certainly impending and substantial risk] standards
are not interchangeable and may possibly lead to different outcomes.”).
25.

Compare Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 157–58 (1990) (employing the “certainly impending”
standard when denying third-party standing to challenge the validity of a defendant’s death sentence),
with Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 153–54 (2010) (granting standing based on
the “substantial risk” of contamination from a neighboring farmer’s genetically modified crop).

26. See, e.g., Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 871, 878 n.11 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (“[T]he

import of Clapper for standing analysis . . . is a question on which reasonable minds may differ.”);
Vorbrodt, supra note 24, at 87 (“Many district courts interpret Clapper as a large hurdle for data breach
claims relying on imminent injury; others interpret Clapper to tighten constitutional standing
altogether.”).

27.

See, e.g., Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Clapper when concluding that
the plaintiffs’ risk of future harm was too speculative to be “certainly impending,” and that they “also
failed to satisfy the ‘lesser standard’ of ‘substantial risk’ of future harm”); see also Joseph J. Vacek, The
Next Frontier in Drone Law: Liability for Cybersecurity Negligence and Data Breaches for UAS Operators, 39
Campbell L. Rev. 135, 159 (2017) (stating that Clapper imposes “stricter requirements” for standing
than the “substantial risk standard”).

28. 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010).
29. Id.
30. 794 F.3d 688, 693–94 (7th Cir. 2015).
31.

See id. at 689.

32.

Id. at 690.

33.

See id. at 693 (“Presumably, the purpose of the hack is, sooner or later, to make fraudulent charges or
assume those consumers’ identities.”); see also Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963,
966–67 (7th Cir. 2016). Lewert involved a data breach at thirty-three P.F. Chang restaurants,
compromising customers’ debit and credit card information. Id. at 965. The court accepted the plaintiffs’
future risk of harm theory based on the analysis from Remijas. Id.
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Here, the Chambliss court conf lated the two standards by stating that “the
threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute an injury in fact. . . . In
other words, there must be a substantial risk that the harm will occur.”34 The phrase
“in other words” demonstrates that the court incorrectly took the “certainly
impending” and “substantial risk” tests to be one and the same.35 In its analysis, the
court omitted any reference to the substantial risk of harm theory, reasoning that it
was “not clear whether future harm from a data security breach will materialize,
[and] uncertain when such harm will occur”—an analysis that seeks literal certainty.36
Since the court ignored relevant case law and failed to analyze the two tests
separately, it incorrectly found that Plaintiffs’ future threat of identity theft was
insufficient to establish imminent injury. Had the court followed the examples set
forth in Krottner and Remijas, it would have completed a separate analysis under the
more relaxed “substantial risk” test and found that personal information, once stolen,
substantially increases a person’s risk of identity theft and is therefore imminent,
satisfying the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III standing.
Second, even if the stricter, “certainly impending” test from Clapper was
appropriate, the Chambliss court applied it in an overly rigorous manner, resulting in
an improper future threat of harm analysis. Clapper involved a constitutional
challenge of a newly enacted statute that allowed the federal government to engage
in surveillance of non-U.S. citizens located outside the United States. 37 Before
proceeding with an “especially rigorous” standing inquiry, the Court acknowledged
its own reluctance to grant standing when called upon “to review actions of the
political branches in the fields of intelligence gathering and foreign affairs.”38 The
Court described at length a series of five highly speculative events involving multiple
parties that would have to take place before the alleged future injury could occur,

34. Chambliss v. CareFirst, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 3d 564, 569 (D. Md. 2016) (second emphasis added) (internal

quotations omitted) (first quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013); then
quoting Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 57. U.S. 149, 158 (2014)).

35.

According to Merriam-Webster, the phrase “in other words” is “used to introduce a statement that
repeats what has been said in a different and usually a simpler or more exact way.” In Other Words,
Merriam-Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/in%20other%20words (last
visited Mar. 29, 2019).

36. Chambliss, 189 F. Supp. 3d at 570 (quoting In re SuperValu, Inc., No. 14-MD-2586 ADM/TNL, 2016

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2592, at *12 (D. Minn. Jan. 7, 2016), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Alleruzzo v.
Supervalu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763 (2017)). An analysis involving literal certainty is an analysis under the
“certainly impending” test, not the “substantial risk” test. See supra text accompanying notes 24–27.

37.

Clapper, 568 U.S. at 401. The respondents, a group of attorneys and human rights, labor, legal, and
media organizations, alleged that the statute violated the constitutional rights of their clients or
constituents with whom they were required to engage in sensitive international communications and
were likely targets of the surveillance. Id. at 406–07.

38. See id. at 408–09 (“[O]ur standing inquiry has been especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the

dispute would force us to decide whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal
Government was unconstitutional. . . . [W]e have often found a lack of standing in [such] cases . . . .”)
(internal quotations omitted).
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then used this “highly attenuated chain of possibilities” to determine that the alleged
future injury was not certainly impending to amount to an injury in fact.39
However, courts have recognized that the Clapper Court did not intend to replace
its well-established “certainly impending” test with a more rigorous approach; rather,
it was the “sensitive context” of alleged constitutional violations that led to the
Court’s “unusually rigorous” analysis of future harm.40 Courts that have properly
recognized the unusual context in which Clapper was decided have found the future
threat of identity theft sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of Article
III standing.41 In such cases, a crucial component in determining whether future
harm is certainly impending is whether information has actually been stolen.42
For example, in 2014, the Northern District of California found it “certainly
impending” that the plaintiffs’ personal data would be misused by hackers after a
data breach of Adobe’s servers.43 Adobe announced that hackers were able to access
the personal information of millions of customers, including names, login IDs,
passwords, credit and debit card numbers, and mailing and e-mail addresses.44 The
court reasoned that “in contrast to Clapper, where there was no evidence that any of
respondents’ communications either had been or would be monitored under [the law
at issue], here, there was no need to speculate as to whether Plaintiffs’ information

39.

Id. at 410. The respondents could only speculate as to whether the following five events would happen:
(1) whether the government would target communications to which respondents were parties; (2) if so,
whether the government would invoke its authority under the statute to conduct surveillance rather than
use other methods; (3) whether the court charged with enforcing the statute’s Fourth Amendment
safeguards would authorize the surveillance; (4) whether the government would succeed in acquiring
the communications of respondents’ foreign contacts; and (5) whether the respondents would be parties
to the communications intercepted. Id.

40. See In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1213–14 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (“Clapper’s discussion

of standing arose in the sensitive context of a claim that other branches of government were violating
the Constitution, and the U.S. Supreme Court itself noted that its standing analysis was unusually
rigorous as a result.”); see also Vorbrodt, supra note 24, at 74 (arguing that Clapper did nothing to alter
the “well-established case law regarding imminent injury in data breach lawsuits”).

41.

See, e.g., Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding the allegations of
future identity theft satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement and recognizing that it was “important not
to overread Clapper,” since it addressed “speculative harm based on something that may not even have
happened to some or all the plaintiffs”); In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1214–15
(distinguishing Clapper and finding the future threat of identity theft sufficient to establish standing).

42.

See, e.g., Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 967 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that
plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were not mere allegations of possible future injury “because their data has
actually been stolen”); Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that the “common
denominator” among data breach cases is that “data actually has been accessed through a security
breach”); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Were Plaintiffs-Appellants’
allegations more conjectural or hypothetical—for example, if no laptop had been stolen, and Plaintiffs
had sued based on the risk that it would have been stolen at some point in the future—we would find
the threat far less credible.”).

43.

In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1220.

44. Id. at 1206.
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has been stolen and what information was taken.”45 Acknowledging that injury would
“be more imminent” if the plaintiffs alleged that their information had already been
misused, the court nonetheless granted standing, because “why would hackers target
and steal personal customer data if not to misuse it?”46
On the heels of Adobe, the Seventh Circuit in Remijas found that Clapper did not
foreclose the risk of future harm as a theory of injury for Article III standing, and
distinguished Clapper by emphasizing that the Clapper plaintiffs failed to show that
their communications were actually intercepted by the government.47 While the
Remijas court granted standing based on the “substantial risk” test, the court
recognized that “it was important not to overread Clapper” since it addressed
“speculative harm based on something that may not even happen to some or all of
the plaintiffs.”48
Here, by failing to recognize Clapper’s unusually rigorous approach, the Chambliss
court wrongly focused on the type of data stolen and the fact that it had not yet been
misused. Adopting Clapper’s demanding “chain of possibilities” template, the court
explained that a hacker must (1) read, copy, and understand the personal information;
(2) intend to commit future criminal acts by misusing the information; and (3) be
able to use such information to the detriment of another by making unauthorized
transactions in another’s name.49 In so doing, the court overlooked the crucial point
recognized by its sister circuits: Clapper’s rigorous imminent injury analysis is
inappropriate for data breach cases.50 Further, while the Chambliss data breach did
not involve financial information, the future threat of identity theft is still a real
concern for victims: Stolen personal health insurance information can be used by
hackers to obtain expensive medical services, to fraudulently acquire government
benefits, or to perpetuate more thefts.51
45.

Id. at 1214–15 (internal citation omitted).

46. Id. at 1215–16.
47.

Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (2015) (“In Clapper, the Supreme Court
decided that human rights organizations did not have standing . . . because they could not show that
their communications with suspected terrorists were intercepted by the government. The plaintiffs only
suspected that such interceptions might have occurred. This, the Court held, was too speculative to
support standing.”).

48. Id. at 694.
49. Chambliss v. CareFirst, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 3d 564, 570 (D. Md. 2016).
50. See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693 (stating that in data breach cases, “a substantial risk will sometimes suffice

to support Article III standing”); Vacek, supra note 27, at 159 (noting that to apply Clapper’s “more
stringent requirement” in data breach cases “would effectively bar most data breach plaintiffs from
proceeding”).

51.

See Class Action Complaint, supra note 12, at 4–5; see also Facts + Statistics: Identity Theft and Cybercrime,
Ins. Info. Inst., http://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/identity-theft-and-cybercrime (last visited Mar. 29,
2019) (“New account fraud occurs when a thief opens a credit card or other financial account using a
victim’s name and other stolen personal information.”); OccupyTheWeb, Extracting Data from Online
Databases Using Sqlmap, WonderHowTo: Null Byte (Jan. 28, 2014, 2:07 PM), https://null-byte.
wonderhow to.com / how-to/ hack-databases-e x t ract ing-data-f rom-on l ine-databases-using-
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Moreover, allegations of data misuse are not necessary to establish standing. A
“common denominator” in determining standing among data breach cases is whether
“the data actually had been accessed by one or more unauthorized parties.”52 Unlike
in Clapper where the plaintiffs did not allege that any of their communications had
actually been intercepted, the Chambliss court established that the data breach had
occurred and did compromise the personal information of CareFirst customers.53 As
the other data privacy cases demonstrate, once a hacker gains access to personal data,
there is no need to speculate whether or when identity theft will occur: The only
remaining step is for Plaintiffs’ information to be misused.54
Finally, the Chambliss court’s narrow interpretation of the injury-in-fact
requirement of Article III standing places data breach victims in a difficult situation:
They face an increased risk of identity theft, yet they have no legal recourse. The
court’s conclusion leaves data breach victims waiting until their information is
wrongfully used before they can take action to protect themselves. This is problematic
because once personal information is compromised in a data breach, the information
is readily accessible to the hacker—the only remaining question is not if the
information will be used, but when.55 Further, as the court in Adobe recognized, the
longer plaintiffs wait for identity theft to materialize, “the more latitude a defendant
has to argue that the identity theft is not ‘fairly traceable’ to the defendant’s data
breach,” creating a separate “standing problem of its own.”56
A better understanding of technology today should dissuade courts from overly
strict interpretations of the injury-in-fact requirement in data privacy cases. Victims
of a data beach often look to the courts for relief;57 the Chambliss plaintiffs did just
that and found none. The court’s holding stands to impede future consumers from
holding accountable those who house their most vital information based on a faulty
interpretation of standing jurisprudence. A more reasonable approach in an
increasingly automated world would afford data breach victims a better opportunity
sqlmap-0150688 (presenting tutorials on how to hack databases and extract “VERY valuable
information,” which includes names, home addresses, and e-mail addresses) (alteration in original).
52.

Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 2012).

53.

Chambliss, 189 F. Supp. 3d at 567.

54. See Vorbrodt, supra note 24, at 109 (“Once this data is accessed and seen by unauthorized eyes, the

damage is done—the hackers have all the information necessary to harm the plaintiffs.”); cf. In re Adobe
Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1214 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (distinguishing Clapper’s “chain of
assumptions” and stating, “[u]nlike in Clapper, where respondents’ claim that they would suffer future
harm rested on a chain of events that was both ‘highly attenuated’ and ‘highly speculative,’ the risk that
[p]laintiffs’ personal data will be misused by the hackers who breached Adobe’s network is immediate
and very real”).

55.

Vorbrodt, supra note 24, at 70.

56. In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1215 n.5; see also supra note 15 and accompanying text

(noting that the alleged future injury must also be fairly traceable to the defendant to satisfy standing).

57.

See Sid Khaitan, A Deeper Look into Class-Action Data Breach Lawsuits, Rippleshot Blog (July 29,
2016, 1:02 AM), http://info.rippleshot.com/blog/a-deeper-look-into-class-action-data-breach-lawsuits
(stating that consumer class actions after the announcement of a data breach are a “dime a dozen”).
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to protect and defend their identities. The court failed to distinguish between the
“certainly impending” and “substantial risk” tests, to limit Clapper to its unusual
facts, and to appreciate the plight of data breach victims. Chambliss has set a precedent
that leaves victims with no other option but to sit and wait for their stolen information
to be used to their detriment.
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